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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this putative class action under S 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, 
thousands of investors sued their broker-dealers, who 
traded on the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), for breaching 
their duty of best execution. Despite the broker-dealers' 
duty to execute trades under the most "favorable terms 
reasonably available," the investors charge the defendants 
executed orders at the price offered on the central National 
Best Bid and Offer system (NBBO), failing to investigate 
other feasible alternatives that potentially offered better 
prices. With hundreds of thousands of investors in the 
putative class, this alleged practice affected hundreds of 
millions of transactions. 
 
The crux of this interlocutory appeal under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(f) is whether plaintiffs' securities fraud claims satisfy 
the requirements for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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23. The District Court denied plaintiffs' petition for class 
certification. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal claims 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. S 78j(b), and 28 U.S.C. S 1331, as well as 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 
28 U.S.C. S 1367. Plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to 
appeal the denial of class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f) which we granted. As an interlocutory appeal, we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(e). 
 
II. 
 
In 1998, the Supreme Court responded to the risk of 
improvident and largely unreviewable class certification 
decisions by amending Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to provide for 
interlocutory appeal by permission of the court of appeals.1 
Recognizing that denying or granting class certification is 
often the defining moment in class actions (for it may 
sound the "death knell" of the litigation on the part of 
plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle 
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants), the Rule 
acknowledges the extraordinary nature of class actions and 
permits the appellate courts to develop a coherent body of 
jurisprudence in this area.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The permissive interlocutory appeal provision was adopted under the 
power conferred by 28 U.S.C. S 1292(e). 
 
2. Before Rule 23(f) was promulgated, the Supreme Court rejected the 
"death knell" doctrine as a justification for circumventing the federal- 
appellate-jurisdiction precondition that a district court decision " `end[ 
] 
the litigation on the merits and leave[ ] nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment.' " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). In 
these instances, appellate jurisdiction was limited by 28 U.S.C. S 1291, 
which provided that the "courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all decisions of the district courts of the United States . . 
. 
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 (1978). Because plaintiffs had the opportunity to pursue 
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The new Rule provides that "[a] court of appeals may in 
its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district 
court granting or denying class action certification under 
this rule if application is made to it within ten days after 
entry of the order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Before its adoption, 
courts were hesitant to invoke an alternative grant of 
appellate jurisdictional authority under 28 U.S.C.S 2072(c), 
which enabled the Supreme Court by rule to "define when 
a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal 
under section 1291." 28 U.S.C. S 2072(c); see also Blair v. 
Equifax Checking Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 
1999) (noting this authority "had gone unused, in part 
because it invites the question whether a particular rule 
truly `defines' or instead expands appellate jurisdiction"); 
7B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 1802, pp. 105-06 (West 
Supp. 2000) (hereinafter Wright, Miller & Kane) ("[Rule 
23(f)] is modelled on Section 1292(b), but differs in 
significant respects from that device in that it requires only 
appellate court approval of the appeal and it does not 
require that the district court's decision involve`a 
controlling question of law' about which the courts are 
divided."). On occasion, courts granted writs of mandamus 
to review certification decisions but with an uneasiness that 
their actions stretched the writ's traditionally restrictive 
parameters. See 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice S 23.61[9][c] (discussing standard and cases); see 
also, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. , 51 F.3d 1293 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (granting order of mandamus to rescind class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
litigation individually if class certification was denied, a district 
court 
decision decertifying a putative class did not constitute a final decision 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 467. At the time, there 
existed no special rules on appealing class certification decisions. 
Reasoning that a "death knell" exception would have to apply with equal 
force to all forms of litigation, the Court rejected this proposition. 
While 
the Court recognized several policy arguments in favor of permitting 
appeals of certification decisions which effectively put an end to 
litigation, without legislative guidance or authority, it ultimately found 
the arguments against such a rule more persuasive. Id. at 470-77. The 
new Rule 23(f) provides the authority as well as the guidance for these 
appeals which was previously wanting. 
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certification). Although we have issued rulings on Rule 23(f) 
motions, we have yet to articulate standards for granting or 
denying permission to appeal.3 
 
The Committee Note is always a good starting point. It 
emphasizes that "[t]he court of appeals is given unfettered 
discretion whether to permit the [interlocutory] appeal, akin 
to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting 
on a petition for certiorari." Comm. Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f). The Note also sketches a rough outline of the types of 
cases courts of appeals should review: "Permission is most 
likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on 
a novel or unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical 
matter, the decision of certification is likely dispositive of 
the litigation."4 Id.; see also 5 Moore's Federal Practice 
S 23.61[9][b]. To provide further guidance on how to 
separate the wheat from the chaff, the Note instructs that 
 
       several concerns justify expansion of present 
       opportunities to appeal. An order denying certification 
       may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the 
       only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to 
       final judgment on the merits of an individual claim 
       that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of 
       litigation. An order granting certification, on the other 
       hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur 
       the costs of defending a class action and run the risk 
       of potentially ruinous liability. 
 
Comm. Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). We can glean from the 
Note, therefore, at least three principles to guide the 
appellate courts in their exercise of discretionary 
jurisdiction: (1) when denial of certification effectively 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Fortunately, four of our sister circuits have written thoughtful 
opinions on the new rule. Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., No. 00-908, 2001 
WL 715773, at *2-5 (4th Cir. June 26, 2001); Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 
221 F.3d 1266, 1271-77 (11th Cir. 2000); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 292-95 (1st Cir. 2000); Blair v. Equifax 
Checking Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833-36 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 
4. In effect, the Rule authorizes appellate courts to "restore equilibrium 
when a doubtful class certification ruling would virtually compel a party 
to abandon a potentially meritorious claim or defense before trial." 
Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 293. 
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terminates the litigation because the value of each 
plaintiff 's claim is outweighed by the costs of stand-alone 
litigation; (2) when class certification places inordinate or 
hydraulic pressure on defendants to settle, avoiding the 
risk, however small, of potentially ruinous liability; and (3) 
when an appeal implicates novel or unsettled questions of 
law; in this situation, early resolution through interlocutory 
appeal may facilitate the orderly development of the law.5 
 
But interlocutory review is not cabined by these 
circumstances. The Note signals that the new Rule gives 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Other courts of appeals have adopted a taxonomy based on these 
principles. In the first case examining the standards for interlocutory 
appeal, Blair v. Equifax Checking Servs., Inc. , 181 F.3d 832, 833-36 (7th 
Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided an in- 
depth description of the three examples mentioned above that would 
merit exercise of interlocutory review. Taking its cue from the Committee 
Note, the court held that cases where certification tolled the "death 
knell" 
of litigation for plaintiffs or placed irresistible pressure to settle on 
defendants presented circumstances ripe for review. The court also held 
that appeals which would help develop the law similarly invited the 
exercise of this review. In Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 
F.3d 288, 292-95 (1st Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit largely adopted the Seventh Circuit's methodology with one 
restriction. To prevent fecund legal minds from framing every legal issue 
as an important question of fundamental law, the court narrowed this 
review to cases in which "an appeal will permit the resolution of an 
unsettled legal issue that is important to the particular litigation as 
well 
as important in itself and likely to escape effective review if left 
hanging 
until the end of the case." Id. at 294. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals 
for 
the Eleventh Circuit discussed the standards for reviewing petitions in 
Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1271-77 (11th Cir. 2000). Adding 
other factors, the court elaborated on the principles set forth previously 
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In addition to those 
already mentioned, the court looked to (1) whether the certification 
decision is likely dispositive of the litigation; (2) whether the decision 
involved a novel or unsettled legal question; (3) the strength of the 
district court's reasoning; (4) the status of the case before the district 
court; and (5) the "likelihood that future events may make immediate 
appellate review more or less appropriate." Id. at 1276. Recently, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the standards for 
granting a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) and adopted the analysis 
enunciated in Prado-Steiman. Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., No. 00-908, 
2001 WL 715773, at *2-5 (4th Cir. June 26, 2001). 
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appellate courts broad discretion. For example, an error in 
the class certification decision that does not implicate novel 
or unsettled legal questions may still merit interlocutory 
review given the consequences likely to ensue. To put it 
another way, if the appellant demonstrates that the ruling 
on class certification is likely erroneous, " `taking into 
account the discretion the district judge possesses in 
implementing Rule 23, and the correspondingly deferential 
standard of appellate review,' " Mowbray , 208 F.3d at 293 
(quoting Blair, 181 F.3d at 835), interlocutory review may 
be proper. 
 
Furthermore, as explained in the Note, interlocutory 
review is not constrained by the potentially limiting 
requirement of 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) that the district court 
order "involve[ ] a controlling question of law as to which 
there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and 
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Yet if 
allowing the litigation to follow its natural course would 
provide the moving party with an adequate remedy, 
interlocutory review will generally prove unnecessary. In the 
end, however, the courts of appeals are afforded wide 
latitude as "[p]ermission to appeal may be granted or 
denied on the basis of any consideration that the courts of 
appeals finds persuasive." Comm. Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f). 
 
We believe these principles provide a useful template for 
courts to work from when evaluating petitions under Rule 
23(f). It is, of course, difficult to foresee all the 
permutations to which this rule will apply, and courts will 
have the task of exercising their best judgment in making 
these decisions. See Lienhart, 2001 WL 715773, at *4 
(rejecting "stringent standards" for review of Rule 23(f) 
petitions); Blair, 181 F.3d at 834 ("[I]t would be a mistake 
for us to draw up a list that determines how the power 
under Rule 23(f) [should] be exercised. Neither a bright-line 
approach nor a catalog of factors would serve well-- 
especially at the outset, when courts necessarily must 
experiment with the new class of appeal."); see also Comm. 
Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) ("The courts of appeals will 
develop standards for granting review that reflect the 
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changing areas of uncertainty in class litigation."). Further, 
as the Committee Note mentions, class certification 
decisions often involve "familiar and almost routine issues" 
that do not necessitate interlocutory appeal. If granting the 
appeal, however, would permit us to address (1) the 
possible case-ending effect of an imprudent class 
certification decision (the decision is likely dispositive of the 
litigation); (2) an erroneous ruling; or (3) facilitate 
development of the law on class certification, then granting 
the motion would be appropriate. But these instances 
should not circumscribe our discretion; there may also be 
other valid reasons for the exercise of interlocutory review. 
Again, we emphasize that the courts of appeals have been 
afforded the authority to grant or deny these petitions "on 
the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals 
finds persuasive."6 Comm. Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
 
The claims here touch on several reasons justifying 
interlocutory appeal. On the one hand, some of the 
securities claims pressed by the putative class members 
may be too small to survive as individual claims. On the 
other, certifying the class may place unwarranted or 
hydraulic pressure to settle on defendants. Either way, an 
adverse certification decision will likely have a dispositive 
impact on the course and outcome of the litigation. 
Moreover, this case raises fundamental questions about 
what type of private securities claims merit class 
certification. For these reasons, the motion was properly 
granted. 
 
III. 
 
We review a decision granting or denying class 
certification for abuse of discretion. In re LifeUSA Holding 
Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2001); Holmes v. Pension 
Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 
2000). The district court abused its discretion if its decision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As set forth in the Note, the district courts"having walked through the 
certification decision, can provide cogent advice on the factors" 
animating their decisions. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
Furthermore, because permission to appeal does not stay trial court 
proceedings, any stay should be sought first from the trial court. Id. 
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" `rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.' "7 
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995) (hereinafter 
"G.M. Trucks") (quoting Int'l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, 
Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)). A class certification 
decision requires a thorough examination of the factual and 
legal allegations. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 
140 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999). For 
this purpose, "it may be necessary for the court to probe 
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question." General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); see also Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 634-35 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); 7B Wright, 
Miller & Kane, S 1785, p. 16 (West Supp. 2000). "Before 
deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In its amicus brief, the Securities Industry Association contends we 
should be wary of extending class certification to cases where the court 
will in effect set market standards (such as "best execution") and, by 
doing so, affect the certainty of capital markets. Generally, it is 
desirable 
for these types of changes to occur through rule making by the 
appropriate agency. But courts should not hesitate to provide remedies 
for litigants injured by unlawful conduct that may not clearly violate 
regulatory standards. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("[T]here is no statute, 
rule, regulation, or interpretation, by the SEC or by a court, that 
authoritatively establishes that, for all trades, the NBBO exhausted the 
category of `reasonably available prices' during the class period. This 
absence of precedent did not, however, absolve the district court of the 
duty to resolve the plaintiffs' securities fraud claim once it was 
presented 
in this suit."); see also Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 
326, 339 (1980) ("The aggregation of individual claims in the context of 
a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
unremedied by the regulatory action of government."). 
 
Even the Securities and Exchange Commission has argued that "the 
mere fact that the [Securities and Exchange] Commission was 
considering (and has now adopted) rules that prospectively affect . . . 
broker-dealers' order handling obligations would not make it appropriate 
for the court to abstain from deciding whether the defendants committed 
fraud with respect to [their duty of best execution] as it existed during 
the period at issue in this case." Br. of Amicus Curiae the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, at 12 n.14, in Newton, 135 F.3d 266. 
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action, . . . [courts] should make whatever factual and legal 
inquiries are necessary under Rule 23." Szabo v. Bridgeport 
Machs. Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 5 
Moore's Federal Practice S 23.46[4] ("[B]ecause the 
determination of a certification request invariably involves 
some examination of factual and legal issues underlying the 
plaintiffs' cause of action, a court may consider the 
substantive elements of the plaintiffs' case in order to 
envision the form that a trial on those issues would take.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
 
Over twenty-five years ago in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, the Supreme Court cautioned against going 
beyond the pleadings in class certification decisions. 417 
U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ("[N]othing in either the language or 
history of Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in 
order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class 
action."). But this admonition must be examined in context. 
At the time, it was ancillary to the principal issue of 
whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 required a class representative 
in a securities class action to provide notice to all class 
members. With a claim that amounted to no more than 
seventy dollars, the plaintiff in Eisen sought to shift his 
notice burden to the defendant because providing notice to 
the 2.25 million potential class members was 
extraordinarily costly (roughly $225,000). The district court 
held that the defendant should bear 90% of the cost, 
because the plaintiff was "more than likely" to "prevail on 
his claims." Holding this burden could not be shifted, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal by the court of 
appeals. 
 
Not long after Eisen, the Court stepped away from this 
bright-line declaration in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
when it held that 
 
       [e]valuation of many of the questions entering into 
       determination of class action questions is intimately 
       involved with the merits of the claims. The typicality of 
       the representative's claims or defenses, the adequacy of 
       the representative, and the presence of common 
       questions of law or fact are obvious examples. The 
       more complex determinations required in Rule 23(b)(3) 
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       class actions entail even greater entanglement with the 
       merits . . . . 
 
437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (quotation and citation 
omitted). Subsequently, in General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, the Court appeared to move even further away from 
Eisen, recognizing that 
 
       [s]ometimes the issues are plain enough from the 
       pleadings to determine whether the interests of the 
       absent parties are fairly encompassed within the 
       named plaintiff 's claim, and sometimes it may be 
       necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings 
       before coming to rest on the certification question . . . . 
       [A]ctual, not presumed conformance with Rule 23(a) 
       remains . . . indispensable. 
 
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. This reasoning applies with equal 
force to certification questions surrounding Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). Szabo, 249 F.3d at 677. As the Court concluded in 
Livesay, class certification may require courts to answer 
questions that are often " `enmeshed in the factual and legal 
issues comprising the plaintiff 's cause of action.' " 437 U.S. 
at 469 (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 
555, 558 (1963)). To address these questions, courts may 
"delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether the 
requirements for class certification are satisfied." 5 Moore's 
Federal Practice S 23.61[5]; Szabo, 249 F.3d at 677 (holding 
courts may "look[ ] beneath the surface of a complaint" to 
"make a preliminary inquiry into the merits"); see also 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) invites a 
"close look" before determining class certification); 7B 
Wright, Miller & Kane, S 1785, p.16 (West Supp. 2000) 
(courts not precluded from "necessary inquiry into the 
underlying elements of the case in order to evaluate 
whether Rule 23 has been met"); Moore's Federal Practice, 
Manual For Complex Litigation (Third) S 30.1 ("The decision 
on whether or not to certify a class, therefore, can be as 
important as decisions on the merits of the action and 
should be made only after consideration of all relevant 
evidence and arguments presented by the parties."). 
 
Since Eisen was decided, the nature of class actions and 
how they are litigated have undergone a sea change. 
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Irrespective of the merits, certification decisions may have 
a decisive effect on litigation. As mentioned, if individual 
claims are small, then plaintiffs may not have the incentive 
or resources to pursue their claims if certification is denied 
--sounding the "death knell" to the litigation.8 On the other 
hand, granting certification may generate unwarranted 
pressure to settle nonmeritorious or marginal claims. 
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299-1300 (granting order of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Trial of plaintiffs' claims here touches on concerns raised by the 
Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 
F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). In Rhone-Poulenc, the court granted a writ of 
mandamus to reverse the certification of a class of hemophiliacs who 
received blood contaminated with HIV. The class involved only a few 
hundred parties, but each individual had claims possibly worth millions 
of dollars. The court reasoned that the enormous size of the potential 
liability would impose an "intense pressure to settle," id. at 1298, 
because "[t]he risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high 
a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low." 
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298). It considered settlements forcibly 
induced by the small probability of an immense judgment "blackmail 
settlements." Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298; see also Castano, 84 F.3d 
at 746; G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 784-85. Although finding the hydraulic 
pressure to settle should not dispositively affect a certification 
decision, 
the court suggested that it should be balanced against the benefits of a 
class action. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 ("We do not want to be 
misunderstood as saying that class actions are bad because they place 
pressure on defendants to settle. That pressure is a reality, but it must 
be balanced against the undoubted benefits of the class action that have 
made it an authorized procedure for employment by federal courts."); see 
also Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co. 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) 
("I doubt that plaintiffs' counsel expect the immense and unmanageable 
case that they seek to create to be tried. What they seek to create will 
become (whether they intend this result or not) an overwhelmingly costly 
and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether just or 
unjust.") (Duniway, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has also 
recognized the dynamic pressure certification sets in motion. The Court 
has observed that "[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the 
defendant's potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may 
find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious 
defense." Livesay, 437 U.S. at 476. Certifying this class raises a similar 
concern because the size of the class and number of claims may place 
acute and unwarranted pressure on defendants to settle. It is a factor we 
weigh in our certification calculus. 
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mandamus to rescind certification based in part on the "the 
demonstrated great likelihood that the plaintiffs' claims, 
despite their human appeal, lack legal merit"); see also G.M. 
Trucks, 55 F.3d at 784-85 (vacating class certification for 
settlement and remanding for further development on the 
record). In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has concluded that "[g]oing beyond the pleadings is 
necessary, as a court must understand the claims, 
defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in 
order to make a meaningful determination of the 
certification issues." Castano, 84 F.3d at 744 (decertifying 
class that sued tobacco manufacturers for nicotine 
addiction). In Castano, the court held that 
 
       a mass tort cannot be properly certified without a prior 
       track record of trials from which the district court can 
       draw the information necessary to make the 
       predominance and superiority analysis required by rule 
       23. This is because certification of an immature tort 
       results in a higher than normal risk that the class 
       action may not be superior to individual adjudication. 
 
Id. at 747. Other courts have followed similar approaches. 
Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675-78; see also Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A- 
Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2000); Hanon 
v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 
In reviewing a motion for class certification, a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary to determine 
whether the alleged claims can be properly resolved as a 
class action.9 This is such an instance. We must probe 
beyond the surface of plaintiffs' allegations in performing 
our review to assess whether plaintiffs' securities claims 
satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23's requirements.) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the 
Claims, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall 2001). 
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IV. 
 
A. 
 
This case is before us for the second time. We have 
already provided a succinct description of the facts, 
including the operation of the NASDAQ market and 
defendants' role.10 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(hereinafter "Newton"). 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellants are investors who purchased and 
       sold securities on the NASDAQ market, the major 
       electronic market for "over-the-counter" securities, 
       during the . . . period from November 4, 1992 to 
       [August 28, 1996] ("the class period"). The defendants 
       are NASDAQ market makers. NASDAQ is a self- 
       regulating market owned by the National Association of 
       Securities Dealers ("NASD"), subject to oversight by the 
       Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 
 
       An "over-the-counter" market like NASDAQ differs in 
       important respects from the more familiar auction 
       markets, like the New York and American Stock 
       Exchanges. The NYSE and AMEX markets are 
       distinguished by a physical exchange floor where buy 
       and sell orders actually "meet," with prices set by the 
       interaction of those orders under the supervision of a 
       market "specialist." In a dealer market like NASDAQ, 
       the market exists electronically, in the form of a 
       communications system which constantly receives and 
       reports the prices at which geographically dispersed 
       market makers are willing to buy and sell different 
       securities. These market makers compete with one 
       another to buy and sell the same securities using the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The defendants who executed the plaintiffs' orders are Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.; and 
PaineWebber, Inc. Each defendant is an "integrated broker/dealer" 
brokerage company that executed trades both as an agent and a 
principal. For certification, plaintiffs are divided into three 
subclasses. 
Each subclass consists of all the class members that placed market 
orders with a particular defendant. 
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       electronic system; NASDAQ is, then, an electronic 
       inter-dealer quotation system. 
 
       In a dealer market, market makers create liquidity by 
       being continuously willing to buy and sell the security 
       in which they are making a market. In this way, an 
       individual who wishes to buy or sell a security does not 
       have to wait until someone is found who wishes to take 
       the opposite side in the desired transaction. To account 
       for the effort and risk required to maintain liquidity, 
       market makers are allowed to set the prices at which 
       they are prepared to buy and sell a particular security; 
       the difference between the listed "ask" and"bid" prices 
       is the "spread" that market makers capture as 
       compensation. 
 
       The electronic quotation system ties together the 
       numerous market makers for all over-the-counter 
       securities available on NASDAQ. All NASDAQ market 
       makers are required to input their bid and offer prices 
       to the NASD computer, which collects the information 
       and transmits, for each security, the highest bid price 
       and lowest ask price currently available. These prices 
       are called the "National Best Bid and Offer," or NBBO. 
       The NASD computer, publicly available to all NASDAQ 
       market makers, brokers and dealers, displays and 
       continuously updates the NBBO for each offered 
       security. 
 
       Plaintiffs allege that technological advances made it 
       feasible during the class period for the defendant 
       market makers to execute orders at prices quoted on 
       private on-line services like SelectNet and Instinet and 
       that those prices were frequently more favorable to 
       their investor clients than the NBBO price. According 
       to plaintiffs, the defendants regularly used these 
       services and knew that prices better than NBBO were 
       often available through them. Even though they knew 
       that their investor clients expected them to secure the 
       best reasonably available price, plaintiffs say, the 
       defendants executed plaintiffs' orders at the NBBO 
       price when they knew that price was inferior and when 
       they, at the same time, were trading at the more 
       favorable price for their own accounts. In this way, 
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       they were able to inflate their own profit margins at the 
       expense of their investor clients. This practice is 
       alleged to violate section 10 of the Securities 
       [Exchange] Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j, and Rule 10b- 
       5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. 
 
       The plaintiffs also charge defendants with two other 
       violations of section 10 and Rule 10b-5. Market makers 
       who simultaneously hold a market order for both sides 
       of a transaction may obtain more favorable prices than 
       the NBBO by "crossing" these in-house orders. 
       Transactions handled in this way are executed within 
       the spread, giving both the purchaser and the seller a 
       better price. Similarly, a customer order can be 
       matched by a market maker with an in-house limit 
       order on the other side of the transaction. Since a limit 
       order specifies a particular price at which to execute a 
       transaction, matching another customer order at that 
       price may beat the currently displayed NBBO quote for 
       that security. Plaintiffs allege that the failure of the 
       defendants to execute orders of their clients in these 
       ways when feasible constitutes a fraudulent practice 
       because, by executing at the NBBO rather than 
       matching customer orders, the defendants capture the 
       full market "spread" as a fee for their services without 
       incurring any actual risk in the transaction.11 
 
Newton, 135 F.3d at 268-69.12 
 
Since the initiation of this action, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has promulgated new rules that 
effectively end the alleged improper practice by the 
defendants. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act. 
Rel. No. 34-37619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48290, 48306-16, 48322- 
23 (Sept. 12, 1996) ("While in the past quote-based 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. For a more detailed description of the alternative avenues for 
executing trades on the NASDAQ (e.g., Instinet, SelectNet) see the 
district court opinion granting defendants summary judgment, In re 
Merrill Lynch, et al. Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. 745, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 
1995), 
rev'd, Newton, 135 F.3d 266. 
 
12. Defendants' duty to provide best execution remained consistent 
whether they were acting as agents of the trade or principals. Newton, 
135 F.3d at 270 n.1. 
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executions in OTC [over the counter] securities were 
generally recognized as satisfying best execution 
obligations, the development of efficient new facilities has 
altered what broker dealers must consider in seeking 
execution of customer orders."); see also Newton, 135 F.3d 
at 271. The new regulations require the NBBO to 
incorporate prices displayed on Instinet and SelectNet as 
well as other sources of liquidity. See 17 C.F.R. 
SS 240.11Ac1-1 to -4 (2000). 
 
B. 
 
Defendants initially moved to dismiss this action under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. At the request of the District 
Court, defendants converted their motion into one for 
summary judgment which was subsequently granted. The 
District Court held that plaintiffs' claims failed to satisfy 
two requirements necessary to maintain a Rule 10b-5 
securities violation--misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact, and scienter--because defendants'"duty of 
best execution" remained ill-defined during the class period. 
In re Merrill Lynch, et al. Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. at 769-71. 
Without a clear standard to apply against defendants' 
employment of an industry-wide practice, the court found 
the nondisclosure of their trading execution practice, along 
with their implied representation to obtain best execution, 
did not constitute a misrepresentation or omission of 
material fact. Id. Even if the practice constituted a material 
misrepresentation, the district court held defendants had 
not formed the requisite scienter, or intent to deceive, 
because they were not aware their practice actually violated 
the securities laws. Id. at 771-72. 
 
On appeal, a divided panel of this court affirmed. We 
granted rehearing en banc. The en banc court unanimously 
reversed the district court and remanded, holding the 
execution of trades at the NBBO, albeit the industry 
standard, could still be considered fraudulent behavior 
violating the standards of Rule 10b-5. Newton , 135 F.3d at 
274. Noting this practice could constitute a material 
misrepresentation with scienter when better prices were 
reasonably available, we expressed no opinion on 
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defendants' liability, only whether defendants' practice 
could be actionable under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 272-74. On 
remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint, extending the 
class period to the time new securities regulations took 
effect outlawing the defendants' alleged tortious practice. 
Plaintiffs then moved for class certification which the 
District Court denied. An interlocutory appeal under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(f) was then granted. 
 
C. 
 
Plaintiffs contend defendants' behavior in this case was 
unvarying, alleging it was their established practice to 
execute trades at prices displayed solely on the NBBO 
without investigating other sources. They claim this 
"common scheme" provides a uniform course of unlawful 
conduct well-suited for adjudication as a class action. 
Plaintiffs also argue that during the class period defendants 
capitalized on their access to alternative trading sources to 
find better prices when trading on their own accounts. As 
noted in Newton, an SEC study reported that a "two-tiered 
market" existed during the class period where market 
makers exploited these services to garner better prices for 
themselves while simultaneously denying them to their 
customers.13 Id. at 273. For their part, defendants argue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. As noted in Newton, a three month study of prices within the class 
period indicated that "85% of the bids and offers displayed by market 
makers on Instinet and 90% of the bids and offers displayed on 
SelectNet were at better prices than those posted publicly on NASDAQ." 
135 F.3d at 272 (citing Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act. Rel. 
No. 34-37619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48290, 48307-08 (Sept. 12, 1996)). These 
apparently incriminating percentages may be mitigated, however, by the 
fact that during a full year of the class period (1993), for example, the 
electronic communication networks (including services like SelectNet and 
Instinet) "accounted for only 13% of share volume in Nasdaq securities 
and only 1.4% of listed share volume." Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Div. of Market Regulation, Electronic Communication 
Networks and After-Hours Trading 6 (June 2000) (citing Market 
2000 Report: Study II, Structure of the U.S. Equity Markets, 1994 
SEC Lexis 133, at *43-44 (Jan. 1994)), available at 
http://www.sec.gov.news/studies/ecnafter.htm. Based on these figures, 
defendants contend plaintiffs' trades could have been executed at 
superior prices from alternative sources only about 30% of the time 
during the class period. See Br. of Appellees at 8 n.7. 
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that without examining each transaction, their past ability 
to obtain a better price for a particular trade is purely 
speculative. On appeal, the availability of better prices 
remains hotly contested. 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, we do not decide whether 
defendants' alleged practice constitutes a Rule 10b-5 
securities violation with respect to each individual member 
of the putative class. Our inquiry only addresses whether 
the federal securities claims alleged by the investors satisfy 
the requirements demanded by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
 
V. 
 
To determine whether the claims alleged by the putative 
class meet the requirements for class certification, we must 
first examine the underlying cause of action--in this case, 
a Rule 10b-5 private securities fraud claim. See Barnes, 
161 F.3d at 138; McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 
1412 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This analysis is critical because 
class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is 
permissible only when "questions of law or fact common to 
the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
For the elements of the Rule 10b-5 claim which remain in 
dispute, "[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance [and 
injury] from each member of the proposed plaintiff class 
effectively would . . . prevent[ ] [plaintiffs] from proceeding 
with a class action, since individual issues then would . . . 
overwhelm[ ] the common ones." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 242 (1988). On the other hand, presuming these 
elements would resolve "the problem of balancing the 
substantive requirement of proof of reliance [and injury] in 
securities cases against the procedural requisites of 
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23." Id. (quotation and 
citation omitted); see also Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (upholding presumption of reliance in Rule 10b- 
5 claims based on fraud-on-the-market theory); Hoxworth v. 
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(affirming class certification where reliance presumed) 
(hereinafter "Hoxworth II"); William Rubenstein, A 
Transnational Model of Adjudication, 89 Geo. L.J. 371, 391- 
92 (2001) (discussing effect of presuming reliance in 
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securities class actions). If proof of the essential elements of 
the cause of action requires individual treatment, then 
class certification is unsuitable. See Binder v. Gillespie, 184 
F.3d 1059, 1063-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding class 
decertification where presumption of reliance and loss 
unavailable), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000). 
 
Under Rule 10b-5 causation is two-pronged. Huddleston 
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 
1981), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 
375 (1983); see also James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman & 
Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Materials 769-71 (3d ed. 2001); 5 A. Jacobs, The Impact of 
Rule 10b-5 S 64.01[a], at 3-221 to 3-222 (Supp. 1980). 
Reliance, or transaction causation, establishes that but for 
the fraudulent misrepresentation, the investor would not 
have purchased or sold the security. Suez Equity Investors, 
L.P. and SEI Assocs. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 
87, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2001); Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 
F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 
116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997). Loss causation 
demonstrates that the fraudulent misrepresentation 
actually caused the loss suffered. Suez Equity Investors, 
250 F.3d at 95-96; EP MedSystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 
235 F.3d 865, 883-84 (3d Cir. 2000). We must first address 
whether plaintiffs' claims are entitled to class-wide 
presumptions of reliance and economic loss before turning 
to the requirements for certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). 
 
A. 
 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). Under this 
statute, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 which provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
       indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
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       of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
       of any national securities exchange, 
 
       (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
       (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
       to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
       make the statements made, in the light of the 
       circumstances under which they were made, not 
       misleading, or 
 
       (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
       which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
       upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
       sale of any security. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. In Newton, we set forth the 
necessary elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation: 
 
       To state a claim for securities fraud under S 10 of the 
       Securities [Exchange] Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, 
       plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a misrepresentation or 
       omission of a material fact in connection with the 
       purchase or sale of a security; (2) scienter on the part 
       of the defendant; (3) reliance on the misrepresentation; 
       and (4) damage resulting from the misrepresentation. 
 
Newton, 135 F.3d at 269; see also Semerenko v. Cendant 
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
It is important to recognize that the facts of this case do 
not resonate with those typical of securities violations 
under Rule 10b-5. Customarily those claims involve a 
fraudulent material misrepresentation or omission that 
affects a security's value. See EchoCath, 235 F.3d at 884 
(citing typical cases: Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 171 (financial 
statement); Weiner, 129 F.3d at 311-12 (corporation's 
financial condition); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 
114 F.3d 1410, 1415-17 (3d Cir. 1997) (projected future 
earnings); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 700- 
01 (3d Cir. 1996) (fraudulent representation of company's 
state of affairs)). 
 
The alleged material nondisclosure here consisted of a 
broker-dealer accepting an investor's order under the 
implied representation of the duty of best execution. This 
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duty requires a broker-dealer to "use reasonable efforts to 
maximize the economic benefit to the client in each 
transaction." Newton, 135 F.3d at 270. A broker-dealer who 
"accepts such an order while intending to breach that duty 
makes a misrepresentation that is material to the purchase 
or sale [of a security]." Id. at 269. If the order was executed 
in a manner inconsistent with this duty, it was also 
performed with scienter. Id. at 273-74. Despite defendants' 
claim that execution at the NBBO price represented an 
acceptable industry-wide practice, we held in Newton that 
plaintiffs had alleged a claim that at least satisfied Rule 
10b-5's material misrepresentation and scienter 
requirements. Id. at 274-75. We did not examine the other 
elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim--specifically, reliance and 
loss causation--because these elements were not relevant 
to the duty of best execution. On remand, the District 
Court picked up where we left off. Although the court found 
no issues affecting misrepresentation and scienter that 
would preclude class certification, it held that individual 
questions on reliance and economic loss presented 
formidable obstacles to class certification. 
 
The parties disagree whether evidence of reliance and 
economic loss are consistent with each trade or would 
require individual treatment at trial. Defendants argue that 
reliance and economic loss cannot be presumed across the 
class for the hundreds of millions of trades at issue. 
Because only class members who detrimentally relied on a 
defendants' execution practice would have a cause of 
action, they maintain the individual inquiry necessary to 
establish reliance and economic loss renders plaintiffs' 
claims unfit for class certification. Whether proof of reliance 
and economic loss are unique to each investor, 
necessitating a trade-by-trade examination, remains 
contested. 
 
B. Reliance 
 
In Rule 10b-5 securities class actions, a plaintiff must 
prove reliance on a fraudulent material misrepresentation 
or omission. Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc. , 24 F.3d 480, 
487 88 (3d Cir. 1994); Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160 (discussing 
reliance). "It is axiomatic that a private action for securities 
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fraud must be dismissed when a plaintiff fails to plead that 
he or she reasonably and justifiably relied on an alleged 
misrepresentation." Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178 (citing 
Weiner, 129 F.3d at 315; In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 
F.3d at 1417). This burden requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that defendants' conduct caused him" `to 
engage in the transaction in question.' " Robbins, 116 F.3d 
at 1447 (quoting Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d 
780, 785 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160. 
"Recognizing that the requirement of showing direct 
reliance presents an unreasonable evidentiary burden in a 
securities market where face-to-face transactions are rare 
and where lawsuits are brought by classes of investors . . . 
this court has adopted a rule that creates a presumption of 
reliance in certain cases." Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178. 
"The reason for shifting the burden on the reliance issue 
has been an assumption that the plaintiff is generally 
incapable of proving that he relied on a material 
[nondisclosure]." Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 
175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), overruled in part on other grounds, 
In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d 
Cir.1988) (en banc). 
 
The seminal opinion on the presumption of reliance in 
securities fraud cases is Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1970). Affiliated Ute 
involved an effort by some members of the Ute tribe to 
distribute its assets among its members. For this purpose, 
the tribe placed its assets in a corporation and issued each 
member ten shares of stock that were subsequently 
deposited in a local bank. As fiduciary, the bank assumed 
responsibility for enforcing the stocks' restrictions. For its 
own benefit and unknown to the Utes, the bank facilitated 
sales of the stock to outside investors at costs below its fair 
market value. When the Utes discovered the bank's 
practice, they sued under Rule 10b-5. In defense, the bank 
claimed the Utes failed to establish reliance on a 
misrepresentation of material fact. But the Supreme Court 
held the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of 
reliance, holding that in cases "involving primarily a failure 
to disclose [material facts], positive proof of reliance is not 
a prerequisite to recovery." Id. at 153. Applying this 
precept, we have held that "the proper approach to the 
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problem of reliance is to analyze the plaintiff 's allegations, 
in light of the likely proof at trial, and determine the most 
reasonable placement of the burden of proof of reliance." 
Sharp, 649 F.2d at 188; see also Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 
1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that " Affiliated Ute 
presumption of reliance exists in the first place to aid 
plaintiffs when reliance on a negative would be practically 
impossible"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (same). 
 
We extended the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance to 
investors when securities dealers failed to disclose a pricing 
policy that overcharged investors in the purchase and sale 
of "penny stocks."14 In Hoxworth II, investors alleged they 
were systematically defrauded by a securities dealer's 
failure to disclose its pricing policy of excessive markups or 
markdowns on different securities. 980 F.2d 912. Because 
of this uniform, material nondisclosure, we concluded that 
the "plaintiffs [were] entitled to the presumption of reliance 
set forth in Affiliated Ute." Id. at 924; cf. Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786-87 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding 
individual questions of reliance in securities class action 
involving investment in tax shelters did not preclude 
certification). In analogous cases, reliance has not been a 
hurdle to class certification. See Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1998) ("A broker-dealer 
commits fraud (in violation of S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5) by 
charging customers excessive markups without proper 
disclosure."); Bank of Lexington & Trust Co. v. Vining-Sparks 
Sec., Inc., 959 F.2d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he failure 
to disclose exorbitant mark-ups violates section 78j(b) and 
Rule 10b-5."); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 
F.2d 939, 942-46 (3d Cir. 1985) (reliance does not bar 
private securities fraud action involving nondisclosure of 
fraudulent credit terms on margin accounts); Ettinger v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 177, 
180, 182 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (reliance not an issue in securities 
class action alleging securities dealer failed to disclose 
improper markups on bonds). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. "Penny stocks are low-priced, high-risk equity securities for which 
there is frequently no well-developed market." Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 
914 n.1. 
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Investors may also be entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance under the "fraud-on-the-market 
theory." This is because "in an efficient market the 
misinformation directly affects the stock prices at which the 
investor trades and thus, through the inflated or deflated 
price, causes injury even in the absence of direct reliance." 
In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8 (citing 
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42). Reliance may be presumed 
when a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission impairs 
the value of a security traded in an efficient market. Basic 
Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42; Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178; In re 
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8. Here 
plaintiffs' claims do not involve an omission or 
misrepresentation that affected the value of a security in an 
efficient market. Therefore, a presumption of reliance based 
on this theory would be inappropriate. 
 
The District Court did not explicitly rule on whether 
reliance could be presumed. Instead the court observed 
that the investors' trades "involved multiple circumstances 
which bear decisively upon the existence of reliance." In re 
Merrill Lynch, et al. Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 391, 395 (D.N.J. 
1999) (hereinafter "Merrill Lynch"). On this point, the court 
found that some plaintiffs may have known about the 
defendants' practice, belying their argument. Id. ("The 
degree of sophistication of the putative class members 
varies widely. Some, no doubt, were new to the world of 
NASDAQ trading; some were institutional investors."). 
 
Plaintiffs contend that defendants' uniform practice of 
executing trades at the NBBO price, even if better prices 
were reasonably available from alternative sources, and 
their failure to disclose the practice to their customers 
warrant a presumption of reliance. Defendants respond 
that at least some plaintiffs knew of the execution practice 
which nullifies their reliance. In support, they cite several 
news articles describing the practice15  as well as an SEC 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, The S.E.C. Tries to Insure that Investors Get 
Better Stock Prices, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1995, at D8; Daniel Kadlec, 
Young Traders Can Be Gamble for Street, USA Today, Sept. 27, 1995, at 
3B; Warren Getler, Reuter's Instinet is Biting Off Chunks of Nasdaq's 
Territory, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1994, at C1; Gretchen Morgenson, Fun and 
Games on Nasdaq, Forbes, Aug. 16, 1993, at 74; Craig Torres, How 
Street Turns Your Stock Trades to Gold, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1993, at C1. 
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report noting that institutional investors (who fall within 
the putative class's broad definition)16  used alternative 
electronic trading sources to obtain better prices for their 
trades. Br. of Appellees at 56-57. Because some plaintiffs 
knew or should have known of their practice, defendants 
assert that reasonable reliance on the alleged nondisclosure 
did not occur class-wide. For this reason, a presumption of 
reliance is arguably unavailable. See Straub v. Vaisman & 
Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 595-98 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
While it seems apparent that some class members likely 
knew of defendants' practice, this knowledge does not 
necessarily invalidate the presumption. When defendants 
fail to disclose material information about a uniform 
practice involving the purchase or sale of securities, 
plaintiffs may be entitled to a presumption of reliance 
which defendants may rebut. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute, 406 
U.S. at 153-54; Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 924; Blackie, 524 
F.2d at 905-06; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 314 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(approvingly noting conclusion that "because plaintiffs' 
fraud-based claims stem largely from misleading omissions, 
reliance can be presumed") (quotation and citation omitted) 
(hereinafter "Prudential"). Presuming reliance class-wide is 
proper when the material nondisclosure is part of a 
common course of conduct.17 Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 924 
(holding class entitled to presumption of reliance against 
securities dealer for failure to disclose exorbitant pricing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Plaintiffs define the class as consisting"of all persons who placed 
market orders with Merrill Lynch or PaineWebber or Dean Witter to 
purchase or sell shares of OTC stock between November 4, 1992 and 
August 28, 1996." 
 
17. Further explaining the justification for presuming reliance from 
material nondisclosures, we noted in Sharp that " `[s]ince nothing is 
affirmatively represented in a nondisclosure case, demanding proof of 
reliance would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that he had in mind 
the converse of the omitted facts, which would be virtually impossible to 
demonstrate in most cases.' " 649 F.2d at 188 n.18 (quoting Note, The 
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 584, 590 (1975) (footnote omitted)). The justifications for 
creating 
presumptions in general are explored in greater depth in 2 J. Strong, 
McCormick on Evidence S 343, p. 437-43 (5th ed. 1999). 
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policy for securities); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 314; 
Ettinger, 122 F.R.D. at 180. 
 
To reiterate, the investors have alleged that the broker- 
dealers failed to disclose their policy of executing NASDAQ 
trades at the NBBO price. Like a securities dealer's failure 
to disclose its policy of overcharging investors, defendants' 
execution of investors' trades at the NBBO price, when 
better prices may have been available from alternative 
services, constitutes a potentially fraudulent common 
course of conduct from which reliance can be presumed. 
See Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 924 (holding plaintiffs entitled 
to presumption of reliance because of defendants' 
nondisclosure of pricing policy);18 see also Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 314. We will not require each plaintiff to prove he 
relied on a practice which defendants did not affirmatively 
disclose. See Sharp, 649 F.2d at 188-89; Ettinger, 122 
F.R.D. at 180. Because their allegations of a uniform 
nondisclosure would make it impractical for investors to 
affirmatively prove their lack of knowledge of defendants' 
practice, the burden of rebutting a presumption of reliance 
is properly placed on defendants here. Therefore, under this 
set of facts, we hold presuming reliance would be 
appropriate because defendants allegedly failed to disclose 
their trade execution practice. 
 
C. Economic Loss 
 
1. 
 
Under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must also establish that he 
suffered an economic loss that was caused by defendant's 
fraudulent conduct. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185; 
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549. If economic loss is evident, 
then plaintiff must prove a "sufficient causal nexus between 
the loss and the alleged [nondisclosure]." Semerenko, 223 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. This was based on an earlier decision by our circuit that the "burden 
shifting rationale of Affiliated Ute was fully applicable" to the 
nondisclosure of an exorbitant markup pricing policy. Hoxworth v. 
Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 202 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(hereinafter "Hoxworth I"). 
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F.3d at 184. Loss causation derives its function from the 
"standard rule of tort law that the plaintiff must allege and 
prove that, but for the defendant's wrongdoing, the plaintiff 
would not have incurred the harm of which he complains." 
Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 
Initially, loss causation was a requirement established by 
the courts. In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig. , 881 F.2d 
1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 
549); Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 942-43; see also Bastian, 892 
F.2d at 685. But under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, it became a statutory element of 
private securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5. The Act 
provides that "[i]n any private action arising under this 
chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that 
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this 
chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to 
recover damages." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(b)(4). 
 
In any event, it is necessary here to separate the concept 
of economic loss from the issue of loss causation. Of 
particular importance is whether plaintiffs have, in fact, 
suffered an economic loss. "[F]ailure to show actual 
damages is a fatal defect in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action." 
Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296, 302 (10th 
Cir. 1987); see also 2 T. Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation 
S 13.7, p. 553 (3d ed. 1995) ("Failure to allege or prove 
actual damages will result in dismissal of any 10b-5 
damage claim."). For this reason, "[i]nvestors cannot 
complain about a fraud that did not cause them any harm." 
Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 
1325 (7th Cir. 1989); Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555. The 
economic loss that plaintiffs claim would be the difference 
between the price at which their trades were executed and 
the "better" price allegedly available from an alternative 
trading source.19 Therefore, to show economic loss, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has explained how the 
measure of damages should be calculated under Rule 10b-5: 
 
       Although neither Section 10(b) of the [Securities Exchange] Act nor 
       Rule 10b-5 contains explicit provisions for determining damages, 
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plaintiffs must establish that a "better" price was 
obtainable for each executed trade. If a "better" price was 
unavailable for a particular trade, then a class member 
could not have suffered injury and cannot maintain a Rule 
10b-5 claim. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court held that economic loss could neither 
be established nor presumed class-wide. Merrill Lynch, 191 
F.R.D. at 397. Finding that defendants' practice did not 
detrimentally affect the value of plaintiffs' securities across 
the entire market nor did it necessarily result in 
overcharging, the District Court found no resemblance to 
cases where economic injury naturally flowed from 
defendant's alleged conduct. Id. at 396. Irrespective of 
reliance, the District Court found that, after reviewing the 
record, many investors received the best available price 
when defendants executed their trades at the NBBO listed 
price. Id. ("The record as it is presently constituted requires 
the conclusion that in a large number of transactions there 
were no better prices from other sources."). Drawing on the 
summary judgment record where it determined from a 
sample analysis of twelve trades executed by defendants 
that only one resulted in actual economic injury to a class 
representative, the District Court concluded that an 
undefined number of class members sustained no economic 
loss whatsoever, necessitating the conclusion that damages 
were not susceptible to class-wide proof.20 Id. at 396; see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       courts have applied the "actual damages" standard of Section 28 of 
       the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78bb(a), to 
Rule 
       10b-5 claims. Under Section 28 of the Act, the "correct measure of 
       damages . . . is the difference between the fair value of all that 
the 
       (plaintiff) received and the fair value of what he would have 
received 
       had there been no fraudulent conduct." Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 
       478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986). 
 
Feldman, 813 F.2d at 301-02 (footnotes omitted). 
 
20. In defendants' motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
examined twelve of the class representatives' trades with the defendants 
during the initial class period (November 4, 1992 to November 4, 1994). 
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also In re Merrill Lynch et al., Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. at 
766. Based on this reasoning, the District Court found the 
question of economic loss remained unique to each 
investor. Plaintiffs argue against extrapolating the 
improbability of class-wide damages from twelve trades and 
contend the District Court erred in finding that"many" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Although the court's opinion mentions thirteen trades, only twelve were 
evaluated. While the court was provided pricing information from 
SelectNet to compare the prices at which the trades were executed, "[n]o 
information on either Instinet prices, SOES limit order file prices or 
payment for order flow arrangements was supplied for any of the 
transactions." In re Merrill Lynch, et al. Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. at 
766 
(footnote omitted). 
 
In the only trade where the District Court found a plaintiff had clearly 
sustained economic injury, plaintiff Binder purchased 1000 shares of 
Optical Radiation through PaineWebber on April 21, 1994. Six minutes 
after receiving the order, PaineWebber executed it at a price of 
$20/share. However, earlier that morning an offer was sent over 
SelectNet that remained open for the entire day to sell 2000 shares of 
Optical Radiation in blocks of 1000 at $19 3/4. Had PaineWebber 
executed the trade at the price offered on SelectNet, the plaintiff would 
have saved $25. 
 
In two other trades, the court also found inferential and speculative 
evidence that better prices may have been available. On the same day 
that plaintiff Binder placed an order to buy 7000 shares of Hydron 
Technologies at 2 9/16, which PaineWebber executed through a market- 
maker in the security, an offer restricted to Lehman Bros. to sell up to 
3000 shares of Hydron Technologies at 2 1/2 was broadcast on 
SelectNet. Based on this restricted offer, plaintiffs contend the lower 
price indicated a better price for the stock would have been available 
from other sources, potentially Instinet. Additionally, plaintiffs assert 
Merrill Lynch's execution of plaintiff Zakheim's purchase order for 120 
shares of U.S. Healthcare at 42 3/4 was, on average, $0.16/share more 
than the price at which Merrill Lynch executed trades in the stock 
throughout the day. For this reason, plaintiffs reasoned a better price 
was more than likely available on Instinet that day. 
 
The District Court found SelectNet would not have provided superior 
prices in six other transactions. Id. While no information from an 
alternative source was provided for the remaining three transactions, the 
court noted it was still possible that superior prices may have been 
available for them. Id. 
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class members were uninjured. But we agree with the 
District Court's finding that plaintiffs' claims would require 
individual treatment to determine actual injury. 
 
In fraud-on-the-market or overcharging cases that 
warrant a presumption of reliance, plaintiffs satisfy their 
initial burden because they sustain economic loss by 
reason of the alleged conduct.21 In fraud-on-the-market 
cases, the price at which a stock is traded is presumably 
affected by the fraudulent information, thus injuring every 
investor who trades in the security. In re Burlington Coat 
Factory, 114 F.3d at 1419 n.8 (citing Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 
241-42). Nor was economic loss a question in those 
securities claims where defendants failed to disclose a 
fraudulent pricing policy that overcharged investors. 
Accordingly, presuming economic loss was the ineluctable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. It bears noting that class actions alleging antitrust injury often 
raise 
similar concerns. In antitrust class actions, injury may be presumed 
when it is clear the violation results in harm to the entire class. 
Bogosian 
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Nasdaq Market- 
Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Bogosian, 
a class of service station dealers sued their lessors, major oil 
companies, 
for forcing them to purchase gasoline at controlled prices in violation of 
the antitrust laws. 561 F.2d 434. We recognized that 
 
       when an antitrust violation impacts upon a class of persons . . . , 
       there is no reason why proof of the impact cannot be made on a 
       common basis so long as the common proof adequately 
       demonstrates some damage to each individual. Whether or not fact 
       of damage can be proven on a common basis therefore depends 
       upon the circumstances of each case. 
 
Id. at 454. Likewise, in In re Nasdaq Market-Makers, a class was certified 
to pursue allegations that market makers of NASDAQ traded securities 
conspired to charge supra-competitive prices on the securities they 
traded for investors. 169 F.R.D. 493. The court noted that plaintiffs' 
claim of antitrust injury was "susceptible [to] . . . common classwide 
proof [because] . . . an illegal price-fixing scheme presumptively damages 
all purchasers of a price-fixed product in an affected market." Id. at 
526. 
Nevertheless, antitrust cases still require proof of injury to each 
individual for common questions to predominate in a class action. 
Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1977) (en 
banc); see also Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 
331, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Windham, 565 F.2d at 66); Kline v. 
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 233 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 
                                32 
  
by-product of the alleged fraud. The same does not hold 
true here. The execution of plaintiffs' trades at the NBBO 
listed price did not necessarily injure each class member. 
Plaintiffs may be entitled to a presumption of economic loss 
only when it is clear each class member has in fact 
sustained economic injury. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 
185. In a securities class action, a putative class may 
presumptively establish economic loss on a common basis 
only if the evidence adequately demonstrates some loss to 
each individual plaintiff. 
 
Because securities claims may take on several forms, 
proving economic loss on a common basis is a fact-specific 
inquiry. See EchoCath, 235 F.3d at 884; Grandon, 147 F.3d 
at 190; see also Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 454 (evaluating loss 
in antitrust class actions). We find no support in the case 
law for presuming economic injury for purposes of class 
certification in Rule 10b-5 claims22 absent indication that 
each plaintiff has suffered an economic loss. See 
Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 184-85 ("[W]here the claimed loss 
involves the purchase of a security at a price that is inflated 
due to an alleged misrepresentation, there is a sufficient 
causal nexus between the loss and the alleged 
misrepresentation to satisfy the loss causation 
requirement."); see also Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448 ("Our 
decisions explicitly require proof of a causal connection 
between the misrepresentation and the investment's 
subsequent decline in value."); Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 
104, 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (injury assumed when security 
purchased at price inflated by fraudulent 
misrepresentation); Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 
624 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). 
 
In assessing the question of economic loss, it is 
important to bear in mind how the facts here differ from 
those in a typical securities action. Unlike a "fraud-on-the- 
market" claim, this case does not involve a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The cases on which we rely generally discuss loss causation in the 
context of applying the requirements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, not class 
certification. Many of these cases arise as class actions, but they 
typically involve motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or 
motions 
for summary judgment rather than class certification. 
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misrepresentation or omission that decreased the value of 
a security. Furthermore, unlike excessive over-pricing 
policy claims, this case does not involve a practice that 
necessarily harmed investors across the class.23 See 
generally Grandon, 147 F.3d 184; Hoxworth II , 980 F.2d 
912; Vining-Sparks, 959 F.2d 606; Angelastro, 764 F.2d 
939; Ettinger, 122 F.R.D. 177. In this case, defendants 
allegedly executed trades solely at the NBBO price. 
Depending on the facts of each trade, the NBBO listed price 
may or may not have provided a class member with the 
best price. Therefore, economic loss to the plaintiffs cannot 
be presumed by the purchase or sale of a security at the 
NBBO price, and we will not presume it across the class. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the putative class would be 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance but not of 
economic loss. Therefore, their claims do not warrant a 
rebuttable presumption of class-wide injury.24 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Plaintiffs also contend that the claims in this case are similar to 
those in Prudential, where we certified a settlement class alleging fraud. 
148 F.3d 283. The claims here are easily distinguished from the 
securities fraud claims in Prudential. In Prudential, the federal 
securities 
claims involved the sale of vanishing premium life insurance policies 
which the insurance company fraudulently claimed would become self- 
funding. 148 F.3d at 300 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. at 500). By purchasing the policies, 
plaintiffs risked economic injury because the instruments were 
structurally incapable of meeting the financial expectations Prudential 
had promised. Whether or not class members actually suffered economic 
injury was immaterial to the viability of the class's claims because the 
insurance company did not contest liability. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
296-97. 
 
24. Citing AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst and Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 
2000), plaintiffs contend that defendants' trading practice established 
loss causation throughout the class because it was foreseeable the 
practice would cause economic harm to class members. See 206 F.3d at 
217-20 (remanding dismissal of securities action for reconsideration of 
loss causation in terms of foreseeability that defendant's conduct would 
have caused alleged economic harm). By focusing on whether or not the 
loss was simply foreseeable, plaintiffs have put an improper gloss on the 
court's opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
explained that "loss causation . . . examines how directly . . . [the 
fraudulent conduct] caused the loss, and whether the resulting loss was 
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VI. 
 
Turning to the test for class certification, we must 
examine the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim through the 
prism of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to determine whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in failing to certify the 
class. A putative class must satisfy the four conjunctive 
criteria of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a): numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.25 A class seeking 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a foreseeable outcome of the fraudulent [conduct]." Suez Equity 
Investors, 250 F.3d at 96 (summarizing the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit's definition of loss causation). Whether or not the loss is 
foreseeable becomes a factor only if direct causation has been 
demonstrated. Id. 
 
Our test for loss causation is framed somewhat differently. As noted, 
a viable Rule 10b-5 securities claim must show a"sufficient causal 
nexus between the loss and the alleged [nondisclosure]." Semerenko, 223 
F.3d at 184; see also In re Phillips Petroleum , 881 F.2d at 1244 (holding 
fraudulent misrepresentation "must touch upon the reasons for the 
investment's decline in value") (citing Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549). In 
other words, to establish loss causation, a claim must demonstrate that 
the fraudulent conduct proximately caused or substantially contributed 
to causing plaintiff 's economic loss. See EchoCath, 235 F.3d at 883-84; 
Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 186. Whether there are differences between 
these standards for loss causation, it is far from certain in this case 
that 
each plaintiff has sustained a loss, unlike the insurance companies in 
AUSA. 
 
In the end, we need not address here whether their claims establish 
loss causation because we find that plaintiffs' claims do not warrant a 
class-wide presumption of economic loss. For those investors who did 
not receive the best available price and suffered a loss as a result, 
establishing loss causation would not be an issue. See Hoxworth I, 903 
F.2d at 203 n.24 (rejecting defendants' argument that excessive markups 
or markdowns may not have been the cause of plaintiffs' injuries). 
 
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides: 
 
       Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class 
       may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only 
if 
       (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
       impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
       class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
       typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
       representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests 
       of the class. 
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money damages must also satisfy the (b)(3) requirements of 
predominance and superiority--namely, whether common 
questions of law or fact predominate and whether the class 
action represents the superior method for adjudicating the 
case.26 
 
Denying class certification, the District Court found that 
plaintiffs' claims were atypical and the class representatives 
inadequate to represent the class. On related grounds, the 
court also held that common issues did not predominate 
and the class action device was neither superior nor 
manageable. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 397-98. As noted, 
we review the District Court's decision denying class 
certification for abuse of discretion. See supra  p. 10. 
 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) 
 
The certification requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) 
embrace two rudimentary principles: 1) the necessity and 
efficiency of adjudicating the claims as a class and 2) the 
assurance of protecting the interests of absentee members.27 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides: 
 
       Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a 
       class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, 
and 
       in addition: 
 
       * * * 
 
       (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
       members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
       individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
       available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
       controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the 
       interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
       prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
nature 
       of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by 
       or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability 
       of concentrating litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 
(D) 
       the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
       class action. 
 
27. We have explained in greater detail that 
 
       [t]he drafters designed the procedural requirements of Rule 23, 
       especially the requisites of subsection (a), so that the court can 
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Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3d Cir. 1994); G.M. 
Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785. If the class does not satisfy each of 
the 23(a) criteria, the suit cannot be maintained as a class 
action. For this reason, we will address each criterion in 
turn. 
 
1. Numerosity 
 
Numerosity requires a finding that the putative class is 
"so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). It is clear the size of putative class 
satisfies this criterion. There are hundreds of thousands of 
class members and joinder would be impracticable. Id.; 
Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 394. 
 
2. Commonality & Typicality 
 
" `The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge,' " because they focus on similar 
aspects of the alleged claims. Barnes, 161 F.3d at 141 
(quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56). Commonality requires 
the presence of "questions of law or fact common to the 
class," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), and typicality demands that 
"the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(a)(3). The significance of commonality is self-evident: 
it provides the necessary glue among class members to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       assure, to the greatest extent possible, that the actions are 
       prosecuted on behalf of the actual class members in a way that 
       makes it fair to bind their interests. The rule thus represents a 
       measured response to the issues of how the due process rights of 
       absentee interests can be protected and how absentees' represented 
       status can be reconciled with a litigation system premised on 
       traditional bipolar litigation. 
 
       *** 
 
       The Rule 23(a) class inquiries (numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, 
       and adequacy of representation) constitute a multipart attempt to 
       safeguard the due process rights of absentees. Thus, the ultimate 
       focus falls on the appropriateness of the class device to assert 
and 
       vindicate class interests. 
 
G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785, 796. 
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make adjudicating the case as a class worthwhile. 1 
Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class 
Actions S 3.01, p. 3-4 (3d ed. 1992). Typicality ensures the 
interests of the class and the class representatives are 
aligned "so that the latter will work to benefit the entire 
class through the pursuit of their own goals." Barnes, 161 
F.3d at 141. "The typicality criterion is intended to preclude 
certification of those cases where the legal theories of the 
named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of the 
absentees by requiring that the common claims are 
comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as 
to the claims of the absentees." Baby Neal , 43 F.3d at 57 
(citing Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810 (3d Cir. 
1984)). 
 
We have set a low threshold for satisfying both 
requirements. See Barnes, 162 F.3d at 141 (noting claims 
based on common course of conduct satisfy typicality); In re 
Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(highlighting that the " `threshold of commonality is not 
high' ") (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 
468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)). That is, "Rule 23(a) does not 
require that class members share every factual and legal 
predicate to meet the commonality and typicality 
standards." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 817." `[N]either of these 
requirements mandates that all putative class members 
share identical claims.' " Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311 
(quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56). Nevertheless, we 
require courts to examine them separately because the 
criteria remain distinct. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56. 
 
a. Commonality 
 
As noted, commonality does not require an identity of 
claims or facts among class members. Prudential , 148 F.3d 
at 310 (citing Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56)." `The commonality 
requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at 
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class.' " Id. (quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56); 
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 
1996), aff 'd sub nom., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591 (1997). 
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The District Court found, and it is not seriously contested 
on appeal, that common questions of law and fact are 
present. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 394. Whether the 
defendants' execution of their customers' trades at prices 
quoted on the NBBO violates Rule 10b-5 constitutes a 
factual and legal claim that is common to the entire class. 
In fact, plaintiffs' claims raise several common issues 
including: 1) did defendants intentionally execute the 
plaintiffs' orders at the NBBO price without examining 
other alternatives; 2) did defendants fail to disclose their 
practice in violation of their duty to their customers; 3) 
were defendants technologically capable of providing 
superior prices to those offered on the NBBO; and 4) did 
defendants' conduct violate S 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See Br. of Appellants at 31. The 
District Court properly held the putative class satisfied this 
requirement. 
 
b. Typicality 
 
The typicality inquiry here centers on whether " `the 
named plaintiff[s'] individual circumstances are markedly 
different or . . . the legal theory upon which the claims are 
based differs from that upon which the claims of other 
class members will perforce be based.' " Eisenberg, 766 
F.2d at 786 (quoting Weiss, 745 F.2d at 809 n.36). The 
criterion acts as a bar to class certification only when "the 
legal theories of the named representatives potentially 
conflict with those of the absentees." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 
631. If the claims of the named plaintiffs and putative class 
members involve the same conduct by the defendant, 
typicality is established regardless of factual differences.28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. One treatise describes this standard as met"[w]hen it is alleged that 
the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named 
plaintiffs and the class sought to be represented." 1 Newberg on Class 
Actions S 3.13, p. 3-77; see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311 
(" `Commentators have noted that cases challenging the same unlawful 
conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 
usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying 
fact 
patterns underlying the individual claims.' ") (quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d 
at 58); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers, 169 F.R.D. at 510-11 ("[The 
typicality requirement is satisfied] where the claims are based on the 
same legal theory and where the class members have allegedly been 
injured by the same course of conduct as that which allegedly injured 
the proposed representatives."). 
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Barnes, 161 F.3d at 141; see also 1 Newberg on Class 
Actions S 3.15, p. 3-78 ("Factual differences will not render 
a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or 
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims 
of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal 
theory."). Our jurisprudence "assures that a claim framed 
as a violative practice can support a class action embracing 
a variety of injuries so long as those injuries can all be 
linked to the practice." Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 63 
(discussing Falcon, 457 U.S. 147). As a result, we have 
concluded that the requirement "does not mandate that all 
putative class members share identical claims," Barnes, 
161 F.3d at 141, because " `even relatively pronounced 
factual differences will generally not preclude a finding of 
typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories' 
or where the claim arises from the same practice or course 
of conduct." Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311 (quoting Baby 
Neal, 43 F.3d at 58); Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 923. 
 
The District Court found that the different circumstances 
surrounding each trade over the class period rendered the 
claims of the named representatives "[a]typical of those 
members of the huge class." Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 
397. It reasoned that "[i]f proof of the representatives' 
claims would not necessarily prove all the proposed class 
members['] claims, the representatives['] claims are not 
typical of the proposed members' claims." Id.  The District 
Court also believed that individual questions on reliance 
and injury buttressed its finding. Id. But typicality does not 
require similarity of individual questions concerning 
reliance or damages on the part of the class representatives 
and class members in a securities fraud action. Blackie, 
524 F.2d at 905-06. In fact, whether the class 
representatives' claims prove the claims of the entire class 
highlights important issues of individual reliance and 
damages that are more properly considered and relevant 
under the predominance and superiority analysis. 
 
In Hoxworth II, we found a putative class of securities 
investors, who had purchased or sold excessively marked- 
up securities, satisfied the typicality requirement. 980 F.2d 
at 923. Although the class members may have purchased 
or sold different securities at varying prices, all their claims 
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stemmed from defendant's "course of conduct in failing to 
advise purchasers of its excessive markup policy." Id.; see 
also Ettinger, 122 F.R.D. at 180-81 (holding typicality 
satisfied where "[p]laintiff 's claims and those of the class 
arise from the same conduct of defendant and are based on 
the same legal theory"). Similarly, in Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 
we held that securities claims involving fraudulent 
inducement to invest in worthless tax shelters satisfied 
typicality. 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985). Although the named 
plaintiffs invested in different tax shelters, their 
investments were "prepared by the same defendants, and 
contain[ed] the same alleged omissions and 
misrepresentations." Id. at 786. The typicality in their legal 
claims was sufficient to meet this criterion. 
 
The named plaintiffs here, like the members of the 
putative class, are purchasers and sellers of securities on 
the NASDAQ. They allege that defendants violated their 
duty of best execution by automatically executing each 
investor's trade at prices listed on the NBBO without 
consulting alternative sources that may have provided 
better value. Plaintiffs' claims rest solely on a single legal 
theory--a Rule 10b-5 violation-- and allege a uniform 
course of conduct--automatic execution of their trades at 
the NBBO listed price. Any differences then among class 
members are factual--which security, at what price, under 
what circumstances, etc. The alleged cause of their injuries, 
however, remains typical throughout the class. Because 
each class member "would need to demonstrate the 
existence of this scheme, their interests are sufficiently 
aligned that the class representatives can be expected to 
adequately pursue the interests of the absentee class 
members." Prudential, 148 F.3d. at 312. The inability of a 
class representative to prove every other class members' 
claim does not necessarily result in failure of the typicality 
requirement. The District Court erred in finding potential 
factual differences rendered plaintiffs' claims atypical. 
 
3. Adequacy of Representation 
 
Class representatives must "fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This 
requires a determination of (1) whether the representatives' 
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interests conflict with those of the class and (2) whether the 
class attorney is capable of representing the class. Falcon, 
457 U.S. at 157 & n.13; Barnes, 161 F.3d at 141. The 
Supreme Court has counseled that this element "serves to 
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the 
class they seek to represent." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. It 
also functions as a catch-all requirement that "tend[s] to 
merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 
23(a)." Id. at 626 n.20.29 
 
After determining economic loss could not be presumed 
class-wide,30 the District Court found the class's 
employment of a statistical formula to calculate and 
allocate damages would create conflicts between plaintiffs 
who were actually injured and uninjured plaintiffs in 
search of a windfall. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 398. 
Questioning plaintiffs' ability to resolve this conflict, the 
court refrained from deciding whether the class satisfied 
the adequacy of representation requirement.31 
 
Following the Supreme Court's observation that adequacy 
of representation is an admixture of commonality and 
typicality, the District Court's reservation appears to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Although in a different context, both the Supreme Court and our 
Court found the potential harm to absentee members of the class 
particularly significant in denying certification in the Amchem 
litigation. 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-28 ("As the Third Circuit pointed out, named 
parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a 
single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In 
significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are 
not 
aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is 
generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of 
exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund 
for the future."). This concern is not implicated in the case before us. 
 
30. "Turning to the other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, reliance and 
damages, it is evident that common questions of fact do not prevail." 
Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 395. 
 
31. Defendants assert that plaintiffs did not properly preserve this issue 
on appeal because it is only mentioned in a footnote in their brief. While 
plaintiffs do not discuss adequacy of representation, they do contest the 
underlying factors motivating the District Court's conclusion. Because 
the issue was present in their opening brief and is implicit in their 
claims, it was sufficiently raised on appeal. 
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based on its earlier conclusion that the class did not satisfy 
the typicality requirement. As noted, the District Court's 
typicality concerns reflect inquiries better addressed under 
our review of predominance and superiority. See supra p. 
41. While the commonality and typicality criteria tend to 
merge into an analysis of adequacy of representation under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), the standards for measuring the 
predominance of common issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3) should not be imputed to adequacy of 
representation.32 That is to say, the reasons for denying 
certification under the predominance standard may not 
necessarily compel denying certification under 23(a)(4), 
because the predominance requirement is more stringent 
than commonality and typicality. See supra note 32. On 
these facts, we hold that counsel would suitably represent 
the class and that there are no foreseeable conflicts 
between the named representatives and the class they seek 
to represent that would bar certification. Therefore, the 
putative class would satisfy the adequacy of representation 
requirement. 
 
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 
 
Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) must 
also satisfy the twin requirements of predominance and 
superiority. The predominance inquiry demands "that 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Superiority 
calls for a determination that a class action is the best 
method of achieving a "fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy." Id. The Supreme Court has explained that 
these elements were adopted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. We have interpreted the "predominance requirement [as] 
incorporat[ing] the commonality requirement." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626. 
The Supreme Court has also noted that "the predominance requirement 
of Rule 23(b)(3) is similar to the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that 
`claims 
or defenses' of the named representatives must be`typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class.' " Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 n.18. 
Notwithstanding, the Court has counseled that "the predominance 
requirement is far more demanding [than commonality]." Id. at 623-24. 
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       to cover cases in which a class action would achieve 
       economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote 
       . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly 
       situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or 
       bringing about other undesirable results . . . [which] 
       . . . invite[ ] a close look at the case before it is 
       accepted as a class action . . . . 
 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). To assist in this "close look," Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3) includes a nonexclusive list of relevant factors: 
 
       (A) the interest of members of the class in individually 
       controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
       actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
       concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
       against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
       undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
       claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely 
       to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Simply, "[i]ssues common to the 
class must predominate over individual issues, and the 
class action device must be superior to other means of 
handling the litigation." Prudential, 148 F.3d at 313-14. 
 
1. Predominance 
 
Predominance measures whether the class is sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant certification. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. 
Unlike commonality, predominance is significantly more 
demanding, requiring more than a common claim. Id. at 
623-24. After holding the class was not entitled to a 
presumption of class-wide loss, the District Court found 
that individual questions of whether each class member 
sustained economic injury presented insurmountable 
obstacles to certification. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 396- 
97 ("[A]bsent proof of classwide pecuniary loss resulting 
from that reliance, there can be no classwide claim for 
securities fraud."). Examining millions of trades to ascertain 
whether or not there was injury, said the court, meant that 
individual issues overwhelmed common questions among 
the class. Id. at 397-98. We agree. 
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Because the automated execution of orders at the NBBO 
listed price did not necessarily injure each class member, 
the District Court found that "whether a class member 
suffered damages would have to be determined on a trade 
by trade basis," because "some class members would have 
suffered damages; while some would not." Id.  at 396. This 
individual inquiry is complicated by several factors. 
Assessing economic injury to a class member would first 
require examining whether a particular trade provided an 
investor with "the best reasonably available price." Newton, 
135 F.3d at 270. The comparison between the price at 
which a particular trade was executed on the NBBO with 
the prices and trades available at the same time on 
alternative electronic sources would only begin to answer 
this question. As the Newton court recognized: 
 
       [A]scertaining what prices are reasonably available in 
       any particular situation may require a factual inquiry 
       into all of the surrounding circumstances . . . . 
 
       * * * 
 
       Other terms in addition to price are also relevant to 
       best execution. In determining how to execute a client's 
       order, a broker-dealer must take into account order 
       size, trading characteristics of the security, speed of 
       execution, clearing costs, and the cost and difficulty of 
       executing an order in a particular market. When the 
       plaintiffs state that better "prices" were reasonably 
       available from sources other than the NBBO, we 
       understand that to mean that, given an evaluation of 
       price as well as all of the other relevant terms, the 
       trade would be better executed through a source of 
       liquidity other than the NBBO (e.g. SelectNet, Instinet, 
       in-house limit orders or market orders held by the 
       defendants, or limit orders place by the public in the 
       Small Order Execution System). 
 
Id. at 270 & n.2 (internal citations omitted). These factors 
would appear to vary from class member to class member 
and, for each class member, from trade to trade. Whether 
a class member suffered economic loss from a given 
securities transaction would require proof of the 
circumstances surrounding each trade, the available 
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alternative prices, and the state of mind of each investor at 
the time the trade was requested. This Herculean task, 
involving hundreds of millions of transactions, counsels 
against finding predominance. 
 
In an effort to gloss over this requirement, plaintiffs 
suggest their expert could calculate the amount of damages 
each class member sustained thereby removing proof of 
injury as an obstacle to certification. In a sworn 
declaration, plaintiffs' expert provided no model formula, 
but instead projected that he could devise a formula that 
would measure damages among the class and serve as a 
plan for allocation.33 We are not convinced. But even if 
plaintiffs could present a viable formula for calculating 
damages (which they have not), defendants could still 
require individualized proof of economic loss. See, e.g., 
Kline, 508 F.2d at 236 & n.9. 
 
The District Court rejected plaintiffs' arguments. Drawing 
guidance from antitrust jurisprudence, the court concluded 
that "[p]roof of damage . . . must be distinguished from the 
mere calculation of damages." Merrill Lynch , 191 F.R.D. at 
396. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
recognized after reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
" `an antitrust plaintiff must prove that his damages were 
caused by the unlawful acts of the defendant. . . [before] 
the amount of damages may be determined.' " Amerinet v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. On this point, the testimony by plaintiffs' expert was limited to the 
averment that 
 
       based on my work and my familiarity with statistical relationships 
       which can be powerfully applied to relevant market data, it is my 
       opinion a reliable measure of damages can be developed in this case 
       based on the application of well-established statistical 
techniques. 
       Based upon an analysis of the types of data set forth in 
Plaintiffs' 
       Damage Submission, I can devise a formula which measures class- 
       wide damages and from which a plan of allocation can be 
       constructed. I will develop the formula using explanatory variables 
       that have been widely-used in published studies analyzing 
       transaction costs and the bid-asked spread. I will test the formula 
       against actual transaction data to make any necessary adjustments. 
       The methodology described herein will, in my opinion, yield a 
       reliable measure of damages suffered as a result of the practices 
       challenged in this lawsuit. 
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Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1494 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 
1081, 1161 (7th Cir. 1983)). On this basis, the District 
Court reasoned that 
 
       [c]lass treatment of damages issues, however, 
       presumes the ability to prove the fact of damage 
       without becoming enmeshed in individual questions of 
       actual damage . . . [.] Where proof of fact of damage 
       requires evidence concerning individual class members, 
       the common questions of fact become subordinate to 
       the individual issues, thereby rendering class 
       certification problematic. 
 
Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 396 (quotation and citation 
omitted). Proof of injury (whether or not an injury occurred 
at all) must be distinguished from calculation of damages 
(which determines the actual value of the injury). Even 
assuming plaintiffs' ability to calculate damages, the 
District Could held this did not exempt them from proving 
each class member suffered economic injury. Therefore, the 
court found that determining actual economic loss on the 
part of each investor would involve individual questions 
that predominate over common ones. 
 
The District Court's analogy to antitrust class actions is 
well-taken. In a Rule 10b-5 securities claim that"impacts 
upon a class of persons . . . there is no reason . .. why 
proof of the impact cannot be made on a common basis so 
long as the common proof adequately demonstrates some 
damage to each individual." Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 454 
(discussing injury in antitrust cases). The ability to 
calculate the aggregate amount of damages does not 
absolve plaintiffs from the duty to prove each investor was 
harmed by the defendants' practice. In class actions based 
on a "fraud-on-the-market," an excessive pricing policy for 
securities, or an antitrust violation, the alleged conduct 
itself causes economic injury. But only those class 
members whose trades could have been executed at better 
prices sustained economic injury here. Determining which 
class members were economically harmed would require an 
individual analysis into each trade and its alternatives. The 
individual questions, therefore, are overpowering. As we 
held in Georgine: 
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       Even if we were to assume that some issues common 
       to the class beyond the essentially settled question of 
       the harmfulness of asbestos exposure remain, the huge 
       number of important individualized issues overwhelm 
       any common questions. Given the multiplicity of 
       individualized factual and legal issues, . . . we can by 
       no means conclude that the questions of law or fact 
       common to the members of the class predominate over 
       any questions affecting only individual members. 
 
83 F.3d at 630 (internal quotes omitted); Barnes , 161 F.3d 
at 146 ("Because nicotine addiction must be determined on 
an individual basis and remains an essential part of 
plaintiffs' . . . claim . . . class treatment is inappropriate."). 
While obstacles to calculating damages may not preclude 
class certification, the putative class must first demonstrate 
economic loss on a common basis. As noted, the issue is 
not the calculation of damages but whether or not class 
members have any claims at all. 
 
The District Court was also guided by our decision in 
Georgine. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. at 396 ("Although in 
Georgine, as in the present case, there were several 
common questions, the Court held that class treatment was 
inappropriate because `each individual plaintiff 's claim 
raises radically different factual and legal issues from those 
of other plaintiffs . . . [.] In such circumstances, the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) cannot be 
met.' ") (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 618). In Amchem, the 
Supreme Court affirmed our determination that a 
settlement class of individuals exposed to asbestos 
products failed the predominance prong because of 
significant individual issues surrounding each claim. The 
plaintiffs had been exposed to "different asbestos containing 
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, 
and over different periods." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626. There 
were also different classes of plaintiffs--some who were 
presently injured and some who had been exposed but 
whose future injury remained speculative. Id.  The 
individualized differences as to amount of asbestos 
exposure and future injury were significant because they 
would "lead to disparate applications of legal rules, 
including matters of causation, comparative fault, and the 
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types of damages available to each plaintiff." Id. at 627. For 
these reasons, the constellation of individual issues 
eclipsed common questions. 
 
Citing the Supreme Court's guidance that 
"[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases 
alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the 
antitrust laws," Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citing Comm. 
Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23), plaintiffs contend Amchem, a mass 
tort action, may be distinguished, and argue that individual 
economic injury need not be factored into the 
predominance calculus. See Hoxworth II, 980 F.2d at 924 
(holding that "uniform scheme to defraud investors in the 
class securities . . . would support class action treatment"); 
Ettinger, 122 F.R.D. at 182 (common question of exorbitant 
markups on securities predominates over individual 
damage calculations). 
 
Although the securities claims are unlike the mass tort 
claims in Amchem, the obstacles to satisfying the 
predominance requirement are comparable. In Amchem, the 
Court found that individual questions on the varying 
degrees and effects of asbestos exposure overpowered 
common ones. The breadth of the claims here may be 
different from Amchem, but the sheer number of claims 
raising individual questions of injury is strikingly similar. 
In Georgine, we recognized "individualized issues can 
become overwhelming in actions involving long-term mass 
torts (i.e., those which do not rise out of a single accident)." 
161 F.3d at 628. The alleged injuries in Newton  arise out of 
the execution of hundreds of millions of trades, not a single 
act of fraudulent conduct. The distinct facts among the 
hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs involving hundreds of 
millions of trades will determine whether securities 
violations occurred. Because plaintiffs' claims will require 
an economic injury determination for each trade, we hold 
the putative class fails to satisfy the predominance 
requirement. 
 
Moreover, as we have noted in securities cases involving 
fraud-on-the-market or excessive markups, injury 
necessarily flowed from defendant's conduct and reliance 
and injury could be presumed. In those cases, if 
defendant's conduct was held fraudulent, a claim of loss 
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naturally followed. Here it remains contested whether 
defendants' conduct in each trade was fraudulent as well as 
whether the investors suffered a loss as a result. Because 
it is clear that at least some of the plaintiffs have not 
suffered economic injury, individual questions remain that 
would have to be adjudicated separately. For these reasons, 
we hold this case does not fall within the scope of those 
"certain cases alleging . . . securities fraud," Amchem, 521 
U.S. at 625 (emphasis supplied), in which predominance 
may be readily established.34 
 
Because economic loss cannot be presumed, ascertaining 
which class members have sustained injury means 
individual issues predominate over common ones. 
Therefore, the District Court exercised its sound discretion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. In the alternative, the putative class argues that under Prudential, 
148 F.3d 283, the predominance inquiry will not be undermined if each 
class member has not suffered economic injury. Br. of Appellants at 47- 
49. But plaintiffs' reliance on Prudential is misplaced. First, the lion's 
share of the fraud claims in Prudential were largely unrelated to federal 
securities law. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 314. In describing the claims, the 
district court observed: 
 
       [M]ost of the plaintiffs' claims [did] not even involve a reliance 
       element. Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, breach of 
implied 
       obligation of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, negligent 
       training and supervision, and unjust enrichment do not involve 
       reliance. An individual issue with respect to one element of a 
small 
       portion of plaintiffs' claims does not outweigh the multitude of 
       issues common to the remaining elements and claims. 
 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 962 F. Supp. at 
516. 
The claims in this appeal fall squarely under Rule 10b-5. Second, 
plaintiffs note that the class in Prudential contained "both injured and 
uninjured policyholders" without barring certification. 148 F.3d at 306. 
Based on this, plaintiffs contend that even if some class members did 
not suffer economic loss, class certification should not be prohibited in 
this case either. We disagree. In Prudential, the presence of injured and 
uninjured class members was evaluated in the context of standing, not 
class certification. Id. at 306-07. But satisfaction of constitutional 
standing does not answer the predominance inquiry. Furthermore, there 
was no dispute over the individual question of economic loss in 
Prudential because the defendant insurance company did not contest 
liability and waived all defenses. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 296-97. 
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in finding the putative class did not satisfy the 
predominance requirement. 
 
2. Superiority 
 
Even if reliance and damages could be presumed or 
determined in separate proceedings after certification, this 
action fails to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)'s superiority 
requirement. 
 
A class action must represent the best "available 
method[ ] for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Here we must address 
"the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management 
of a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). According to 
the District Court, the need for individualized inquiry into 
actual injury transformed the "[e]xploration of each and 
every customer's NASDAQ transactions with defendants 
during the period from November 4, 1992 to August 28, 
1996 [into] a mind-boggling undertaking." Merrill Lynch, 
191 F.R.D. at 398. We agree. With hundreds of millions of 
trades, it is difficult to imagine how this case can be tried.35 
 
Contending each individual claim is so small that only a 
class action will provide a remedy, plaintiffs maintain that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not preserved this issue on 
appeal because they did not address superiority in their initial brief. 
See 
Br. of Appellees at 69. The plaintiffs' waiver of a dispositive issue, 
they 
argue, provides sufficient grounds for affirming the District Court. See 
Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding issues to be 
appealed must appear in briefing to be preserved). Although the plaintiffs 
do not address superiority directly in their brief, they raise the issue 
specifically in their reply brief, and the facts and arguments on 
superiority are present throughout their brief. We have concluded that 
" `[a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief.' " 
Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dept. of Elections, 
174 F.3d 305, 316 n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Laborers' Int'l Union of 
N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)). We also 
reasoned that "absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain 
statements of all issues presented for appeal, together with supporting 
arguments and citations." Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 
1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991). But we believe the issue of superiority was 
implicit in the plaintiffs' opening brief and was adequately raised on 
appeal. 
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denying certification will absolve defendants from 
wrongdoing. The District Court rejected this rationale as a 
"basis for excusing plaintiffs from proving the essential 
elements of their cause of action." Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. 
at 398. We agree. Recently we held this factor "by itself is 
insufficient to overcome the hurdles of predominance and 
superiority and efficient and fair management of a trial, 
which Rule 23(b) requires." In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 
F.3d at 148 n.13. We also recognize that some class 
members, such as large institutional investors who fall 
within the class definition, arguably would have a 
significant financial stake to raise stand-alone claims. 
 
Turning to manageability, the District Court's evaluation 
must be "granted a wide range of discretion." Link v. 
Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 
1977). "Manageability is a practical problem, one with 
which a district court generally has a greater degree of 
expertise and familiarity than does the appellate court." In 
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1011. It encompasses 
"the whole range of practical problems that may render the 
class action format inappropriate for a particular suit." 
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 164. 
 
Here there are hundreds of millions of transactions 
executed over several years. Plaintiffs maintain their expert 
can devise a formula for calculating injury and damages 
that will allay manageability concerns. Yet we are hesitant 
to rely on a formulaic nostrum given the consequences if it 
fails to meet expectations. See Windham, 565 F.2d at 70 
("But where the court finds, on the basis of substantial 
evidence as here, that there are serious problems now 
appearing, it should not certify the class merely on the 
assurance of counsel that some solution will be found."). As 
noted, actual injury cannot be presumed, and defendants 
have the right to raise individual defenses against each 
class member. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 
1011 ("The potential for individual defenses . . . clearly 
poses significant case management concerns."). We hold 
that establishing proof of the plaintiffs' injuries and 
litigating the defenses available to the defendants would 
present insurmountable manageability problems for the 
District Court. 
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The superiority requirement also casts serious doubt on 
the efficiency and manageability of certifying this class for 
trial. "In terms of efficiency, a class of this magnitude and 
complexity could not be tried. There are simply too many 
uncommon issues, and the number of class members is 
surely too large. Considered as a litigation class, then, the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of 
this action are insurmountable." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 632- 
33.36 Although plaintiffs attempt to fit this case under 
Prudential, that case raised different issues because the 
class was certified for the purpose of settlement. This is 
significant because "the settlement approval inquiry is far 
different from the certification inquiry. In settlement 
situations, the superiority requirement arguably translates 
into the question whether the settlement is a more 
desirable outcome for the class than individualized 
litigation, and may assure that the settlement has not 
grossly undervalued plaintiffs' interests." G.M. Trucks, 55 
F.3d at 796. Significantly, in Prudential we did not have to 
"inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 
intractable management problems . . . for the proposal 
[was] that there be no trial." Amchem , 521 U.S. at 620. 
Additionally we have recognized that adjudicating Rule 10b- 
5 securities claims as a class action satisfies superiority 
only if the litigation results in fewer individual actions. 
Because injury determinations must be made on an 
individual basis in this case, adjudicating the claims as a 
class will not reduce litigation or save scarce judicial 
resources. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs fail to 
satisfy the superiority standard. See G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d 
at 783 ("One of the paramount values in [class actions] is 
efficiency. Class certification enables courts to treat 
common claims together, obviating the need for repeated 
adjudications on the same issue."). 
 
We are also mindful that Amchem and Prudential involved 
mature claims. The class settlements were the result of 
verdicts on established liability and damages awards. This 
case does not share a similar track record. Of course, many 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Of course, one of the central concerns behind denying certification in 
Georgine was the potential harm to absentee members. This is not a 
factor here. 
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securities fraud claims do not generally implicate maturity 
concerns because they do not raise complex issues of 
causation and injury. Furthermore, the divergent outcomes 
in Amchem and Prudential make it clear that maturity alone 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for certification, but it 
may help to ensure that class certification is "superior to 
individual adjudication." Castano, 84 F.3d at 747. 
 
The specter of adjudicating plaintiffs' claims at trial is, at 
the very least, daunting. Individual questions of economic 
loss present insurmountable manageability problems. 
Moreover, class certification would place hydraulic pressure 
on defendants to settle which weighs in the superiority 
analysis. See supra note 8. At trial, determining actual 
injury would require hundreds of millions of individual 
assessments. For these reasons, the District Court was 
clearly within its sound discretion to hold this case failed to 
satisfy the superiority requirement. 
 
VII. 
 
In sum, although the putative class satisfies the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), it cannot meet the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In particular, the 
investors' claims fail the predominance and superiority 
requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). For these 
reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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